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10000 WAYS https://10000ways.dk/en/home/ From lab to market — and everything in between Sun, 12 Apr 2026 08:00:00 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.5 https://10000ways.dk/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/favicon_512-150x150.png 10000 WAYS https://10000ways.dk/en/home/ 32 32 The Funding Maze: A Practical Guide to Danish and EU Grants for Deep-Tech Startups https://10000ways.dk/en/funding-maze-danish-eu-grants/ Sun, 12 Apr 2026 08:00:00 +0000 http://10000ways.dk/funding-maze-danish-eu-grants/ What I wish someone had told me before I started writing my first grant application.

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What I wish someone had told me before I started writing my first grant application.


Between 2015 and 2024, I raised funding from nearly every major programme available to a Danish deep-tech startup. InnoBooster. InnoFounder. Industrial PhD. EIC Accelerator. Regional grants. EU Eurostars. Private VCs. And finally, a PE acquisition.

Some of those applications sailed through. Others were rejected multiple times before succeeding. A few I wouldn’t bother with if I had to do it again.

Now that I sit on the other side — as a member of the Innovation Fund Denmark InnoBooster evaluation panel — I see the same mistakes I used to make repeated by every new cohort of applicants. This post is an attempt to save you some time.

The landscape: what’s available and what it’s for

If you’re a science-based or deep-tech startup in Denmark, you have access to one of the better public funding ecosystems in Europe. But the programmes serve different purposes, and applying to the wrong one wastes everyone’s time.

InnoFounder is for very early-stage — you’re still at the idea or prototype phase, probably still at a university or research institution. It’s essentially a salary for 12 months so you can work full-time on validating your concept. It’s personal, not company-level funding.

InnoBooster is the workhorse grant for Danish startups. It co-funds specific development projects — you put up matching funding (cash or in-kind), and Innovation Fund Denmark covers a portion. Typical grants range from a few hundred thousand to a couple of million DKK. This is where most deep-tech startups should start.

EIC Accelerator (formerly SME Instrument) is the EU-level programme. It’s significantly larger — up to €2.5 million in grant plus up to €15 million in equity — but also significantly harder to get. When we won it at RadiSurf, we were one of 119 selected from 2,130 applicants. The acceptance rate fluctuates, but expect single-digit percentages.

Eurostars requires a cross-border consortium (at least two companies from two countries) and is focused on collaborative R&D. Good for deep-tech companies that already have international partners or customers who want to co-develop something.

Grand Solutions from Innovation Fund Denmark is for larger, more strategic projects — usually involving universities and multiple industry partners. Less relevant for early-stage startups, more for companies with an established research track record.

The three mistakes everyone makes

Having now read applications from both sides of the table, the same three problems come up again and again:

Mistake 1: Leading with the technology. Scientists love their science. I get it — I have a PhD in nanoscience, and I can talk about polymer brushes for hours. But evaluators are not reviewing your paper for a journal. They want to know: what problem does this solve? Who has this problem? How big is the market? How will you make money? Lead with the business case. Put the technology in the supporting section.

Mistake 2: Vague commercialisation plans. “We will target the European market” is not a plan. “We will approach the top 15 automotive adhesive suppliers in Germany through direct sales, starting with the three we’ve already had pilot discussions with” is a plan. Evaluators can tell the difference between someone who has talked to customers and someone who hasn’t.

Mistake 3: Underestimating the team section. The team is often the deciding factor between two equally strong applications. If you’re a solo technical founder with no commercial experience, that’s a red flag. Evaluators want to see that someone on the team knows how to sell, manage finances, and build a business — not just run experiments. If you don’t have that person yet, be honest about it and explain how you’ll address the gap.

Timing and strategy

The meta-game of startup funding is about sequencing. Here’s a rough playbook that worked for us:

Phase 1: Grant-funded validation. Use InnoFounder or early InnoBooster grants to validate your concept, build a prototype, and talk to potential customers. This phase is about de-risking — proving that the technology works outside the lab and that someone will pay for it.

Phase 2: Larger grants + first revenue. Apply for bigger InnoBooster grants or EU programmes as you gain traction. Ideally, you have at least some customer validation (letters of intent, pilot agreements, early revenue) before going for EIC Accelerator.

Phase 3: Private capital. Once you have grant-funded proof points and early revenue, you’re in a much stronger position to raise from VCs. Grants have already de-risked the technology for them, and your traction demonstrates market pull.

Phase 4: Scale. Larger rounds, growth capital, PE involvement, or strategic exits. This is where the earlier phases pay off.

What I tell founders now

When founders come to me for advice on fundraising, I usually start with three questions:

1. Where are you in the sequence? Don’t apply for EIC Accelerator if you haven’t validated your concept with customers yet. Don’t approach VCs if you haven’t de-risked with grant funding first. Each stage builds on the previous one.

2. What’s your matching capacity? Most grants require co-funding. If you don’t have the cash (or credible in-kind contributions), the application will be weak regardless of how good the technology is.

3. Can you afford the time? A serious EIC Accelerator application takes weeks of full-time work. An InnoBooster application is lighter but still significant. If you’re a solo founder trying to build a product, serve customers, and write grant applications simultaneously, something will suffer. Budget the time honestly.

The Danish and European funding landscape is genuinely supportive of deep-tech innovation. But it’s not free money — it’s an investment of time, effort, and strategic planning. Approach it like you’d approach any other business decision: with a clear goal, realistic timelines, and a willingness to learn from the applications that don’t succeed.

Because there will be applications that don’t succeed. I’ve had plenty. That’s just another one of the 10,000 ways that don’t work — and each one teaches you something for the next.


Mikkel Kongsfelt sits on the Innovation Fund Denmark InnoBooster evaluation panel and has raised from most major Danish and EU funding programmes. He advises deep-tech startups on fundraising and strategy through 10000 WAYS ApS.

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From PhD to Acquisition: What I Learned Building RadiSurf https://10000ways.dk/en/phd-to-acquisition-radisurf/ Fri, 20 Mar 2026 09:00:00 +0000 http://10000ways.dk/phd-to-acquisition-radisurf/ Nine years, six patents, 30+ countries, and one very long journey from a university lab to an international exit.

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Nine years, six patents, 30+ countries, and one very long journey from a university lab to an international exit.


In August 2015, I walked out of my Post Doc position at Aarhus University’s Interdisciplinary Nanoscience Center (iNANO) and into the most uncertain period of my life. I was about to try to turn a PhD project on polymer brush coatings into a company. I had no customers, no revenue, no employees, and — if I’m honest — only a vague idea of how a business actually works.

Nearly nine years later, RadiSurf was acquired by KCK Group, an international private equity fund, in a deal that would fund the construction of the world’s first factory for polymer brush coating agents. By then we had more than 30 international B2B clients, six patents, EIC Accelerator funding from the EU, and a team spread across multiple countries.

This is what I learned along the way.

The technology was never the problem

Our technology was genuinely groundbreaking. Polymer brushes are densely packed chains of molecules anchored to a surface, creating a kind of nano-Velcro that makes incompatible materials bond. Metals to plastics. Ceramics to polymers. Things that shouldn’t stick together, sticking together — at the molecular level.

I’d spent four and a half years on my PhD and another year as a Post Doc developing the science. I had publications. I had proof of concept. I understood the chemistry better than almost anyone.

None of that mattered when I sat across from my first potential customer.

What mattered was: can you solve my problem? How much does it cost? How long does it take? Can I try it next week? And — most importantly — why should I change my current process, which works fine, to use something I’ve never heard of?

This was my first major lesson: the gap between “technically possible” and “commercially viable” is enormous, and nobody at university prepares you for it.

Year one: everything takes longer than you think

We co-founded RadiSurf with my three PhD supervisors — Kim Daasbjerg, Steen Uttrup Pedersen, and Marcel Maciejewski — who became the founding board. The university technology transfer office helped with the initial IP framework. I became CEO by default, mostly because I was the only one willing to leave my academic position.

The first year was a brutal education. I learned that raising your first grant takes months, not weeks. That potential customers are happy to talk about your technology but very slow to actually test it. That “we’re very interested” in business language means “maybe, but probably not.” That being a CEO is 80% admin, sales, and firefighting, and 20% the actual technology work you started the company to do.

I also learned that being a scientist is actually a strong foundation for entrepreneurship — you’re trained to form hypotheses, test them, and adjust based on evidence. The problem is that scientists are also trained to be thorough, cautious, and comprehensive. Business rewards speed, decisiveness, and “good enough.”

The funding journey: a crash course

Over the following years, I became deeply familiar with the Danish and European funding landscape. We raised from nearly every major soft funding programme in Denmark — InnoBooster from Innovation Fund Denmark, industrial PhD schemes, various regional and national grants. We applied for the EU’s SME Instrument (now the EIC Accelerator) and were selected — one of only 119 companies out of 2,130 applicants. That grant alone was €1.4 million.

Here’s what I learned about fundraising:

Soft funding is a double-edged sword.

Grants are non-dilutive capital, which is fantastic. But they come with reporting requirements, milestone commitments, and the subtle danger of building your company around what gets funded rather than what the market needs.

Every funding application is a sales pitch.

Evaluators don’t care about your molecule — they care about your market, your team, and your path to revenue. I reviewed too many applications from fellow scientists who spent 80% of their proposal on the technology and 20% on the business. It should be the opposite.

Raising capital is a full-time job.

I seriously underestimated how much time fundraising would consume. At various points, I was simultaneously managing grant applications, VC conversations, and customer relationships — and none of them got the attention they deserved.

Scaling: where science meets reality

The middle years of RadiSurf were about scaling — more customers, more applications, more countries, more complexity. We went from Danish customers to European ones, then global. We set up operations to serve B2B clients in over 30 countries.

Scaling a deep-tech company is different from scaling a SaaS business. You can’t just add servers. Physical products mean supply chains, quality control, regulatory compliance, and customers who want to visit your lab before they’ll commit to a pilot.

I learned that managing complexity is the real job of a CEO. Not being the smartest person in the room about the technology — but being the person who keeps all the plates spinning while the company grows.

The acquisition

In 2021, KCK Group — a major international private equity fund — acquired RadiSurf. The deal brought substantial new capital into the company for global expansion, including building a dedicated factory in Aarhus.

I want to be transparent about this: the widely reported figures for the deal included significant new investment into the company itself. It was a transformative event for RadiSurf, but I’d caution any founder against measuring success purely in terms of exit multiples. The real value of the RadiSurf journey was the decade of learning — about technology, about business, about myself.

I stayed on as CEO until early 2024, overseeing the transition and the early stages of the new chapter.

What I’d do differently

If I could go back and talk to 2015-Mikkel, here’s what I’d tell him:

Hire for the gaps, not the skills you already have. As a scientist-CEO, I was surrounded by technical excellence. What I needed earlier was commercial experience, operational expertise, and someone who actually liked doing financial modelling.

Say no more often. Deep-tech companies get pulled in a hundred directions by customers who want custom solutions. Every “yes” to a one-off project is a “no” to building a scalable product. I said yes too many times.

Build relationships with investors before you need money. The worst time to start talking to VCs is when you’re running out of cash. The best time is when things are going well and you don’t need them yet.

Take care of yourself. I’m a D-style personality — driven, results-oriented, impatient. I powered through problems that should have made me pause. Building a startup is a marathon, not a sprint, and I didn’t always treat it that way.

What comes after

Today, I run Redox-Flow (electrochemical lab equipment), co-founded Decameal (sustainable protein from invasive crabs), invest in startups through MKInvest, and advise founders through 10000 WAYS ApS. I’m also Chairman of GephionBio (cultivated meat), sit on the boards of Fauna and Rathlouskolen, and serve on the Innovation Fund Denmark InnoBooster panel — on the other side of the evaluation table now.

Every one of these roles draws on something I learned at RadiSurf. The failures more than the successes.

RadiSurf taught me that building a deep-tech company is one of the hardest and most rewarding things a scientist can do. It’s not for everyone. But if you’re a researcher with a technology that could change something in the real world, and you’re wondering whether to make the leap — I’d say do it. Just be prepared to find 10,000 ways that don’t work before you find the one that does.


Mikkel Kongsfelt is a scientist turned entrepreneur based in Odder, Denmark. He holds a PhD in Nanoscience from Aarhus University and executive education from Harvard Business School. He advises deep-tech founders on strategy, IP, and fundraising through 10000 WAYS ApS.

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10,000 Ways That Won’t Work https://10000ways.dk/en/10000-ways-that-wont-work/ Thu, 05 Mar 2026 09:00:00 +0000 http://10000ways.dk/10000-ways-that-wont-work/ Why I named my company after failure — and why your catalogue of failures is the most valuable thing you own.

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Why I named my company after failure


When people ask about the name “10000 WAYS,” I tell them it comes from the Edison quote: “I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work.” Most people nod politely. Some think it’s cute. But for me, it’s not a motivational poster — it’s a job description.

I spent nearly nine years building RadiSurf, a nanotechnology company we spun out of Aarhus University in 2015. In those nine years, I found hundreds of ways that didn’t work. Products that customers didn’t want. Funding applications that got rejected. Partnerships that fell apart. Pricing models that made no sense. Hiring decisions I’d undo if I could. Patent strategies that cost too much and protected too little. Trade shows where nobody stopped at our booth.

The thing nobody tells you about building a deep-tech startup is that the technology is usually the easy part. The hard part is everything else — and “everything else” is where most of the 10,000 failed attempts happen.

The myth of the brilliant pivot

There’s a popular narrative in startup culture about the “pivot” — that magical moment where the founder sees the light, changes direction, and suddenly everything works. It makes for a great story. It’s also mostly fiction.

What actually happens is more like this: you try something. It doesn’t work. You try a variation. That doesn’t work either. You talk to a customer who gives you an idea. You try that. It half-works. You iterate. You talk to more customers. You adjust. You fail again. You adjust again. Slowly — painfully slowly — you converge on something that works. Not because you had a flash of insight, but because you systematically eliminated the things that didn’t work.

At RadiSurf, our technology was genuinely novel — polymer brush coatings that could make incompatible materials bond at the molecular level. Think of it as nano-Velcro. The science was sound from day one. But finding the right market, the right application, the right price point, the right way to explain it to a manufacturing engineer who just wants to glue two things together — that took years of trial and error.

Why failure matters more than success

I’m now at a point in my career where I run one company (Redox-Flow), co-founded another (Decameal), invest in several more, and advise founders through 10000 WAYS ApS. And the most valuable thing I bring to every conversation isn’t my PhD, my Harvard education, or my exit experience. It’s my catalogue of failures.

When a founder tells me they’re planning to apply for EIC Accelerator funding, I can tell them exactly which mistakes to avoid — because I made most of them myself before we eventually won the grant (one of only 119 selected from 2,130 applicants). When someone asks about patent strategy, I can explain which of our six patents actually mattered and which ones we probably shouldn’t have filed. When a deep-tech CEO is struggling with B2B sales, I know how it feels because I’ve sat in those meetings where the technology is brilliant and the customer still says no.

Failure is only wasted if you don’t learn from it. And it’s doubly wasted if you keep the lessons to yourself.

The 10,001st way

The name “10000 WAYS” is deliberately incomplete. Edison didn’t stop at 10,000 failed attempts — he kept going until he found the one that worked. The whole point of the 10,000 ways that don’t work is that they bring you closer to the one that does.

That’s the mindset I try to bring to everything I do. It’s not optimism — I’m actually quite impatient and direct (my DiSC profile is firmly in the “D” quadrant, which is a polite way of saying I don’t enjoy small talk and I’d rather be doing something than talking about doing something). It’s more like stubbornness with a system.

You try. You fail. You learn. You try again. The only real failure is stopping.

That’s what 10,000 WAYS is about. Not the failures themselves, but the refusal to let them be the end of the story.


Mikkel Kongsfelt is a scientist turned entrepreneur based in Odder, Denmark. He is CEO & Co-Owner of Redox-Flow, Co-Founder of Decameal, and angel investor in deep-tech and food-tech startups. He advises founders on strategy, IP, and fundraising through 10000 WAYS ApS.

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